In the first panel of a mural painted in the Abelardo L. Rodríguez Market, a few blocks from the central plaza in Mexico City, porcine businessmen sit at a table counting gold coins.
networks based on family and regional identity that allowed them to integrate wheat, flour, and bread into a cohesive complex. The forging of this complex occurred through a long chain of immigrants, mostly from the Basque-speaking Baztán Valley in Navarre, the first of whom appears to have been Pedro Albaitero. Albaitero arrived around 1855, decades before the first wave of immigrants, and married ten years later into a Mexican provincial elite family. 18 The dowry was likely key to the initial establishment of Albaitero's bakeries, but his subsequent expansion relied on fellow immigrants rather than on his in-laws. He formed a partnership with fellow Baztanese José Arrache-who married into the same Mexican family in 1874-and then brought over several nephews. 19 One of these, Juan Irigoyen, married Albaitero's daughter and established himself as a major planter and miller in the Bajío, the fertile crescent-shaped region northwest of Mexico City. Together with his brothers, Irigoyen came to control much of the wheat supply to the capital.
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Albaitero and Arrache's key innovation was to insert flourmills inside the city, further from the wheat fields but closer to the bakeries. New steam-powered machinery liberated mills reasonably well fed, government officials appear to have established a tacit agreement to restrain striking workers as long as bakeries kept their prices low. As a result, profits came from maintaining labor and infrastructure expenses to a minimum. Keeping capital expenses low also sprang from the functioning of chain migration. Bakeries remained small production units dispersed throughout the city in order to facilitate the movement of immigrants from clerks to owners. Concentration and mechanization of production would have hindered the social mobility that predicated the ethnic solidarity of the immigrants by raising the economic barriers to proprietorship. 43 With few exceptions, then, owners resisted investing in machinery. 44 As a result, owners themselves would have had to pay for the higher wages and shorter shifts that the bakers demanded.
This model of entrepreneurial expansion kept bakery production archaic, but it granted the Spanish owners an extraordinary coherence with which to resist their bakers' demands and defend their source of profits. The strikes only seemed to strengthen their family ties and ethnic and regional identity. Iriarte's relatives and associates moved to increase their collective authority over their workers by establishing the "Union of Bakery Proprietors of Mexico City" in 1924. The union created a fund to help owners endure strikes and to encourage disciplined unity.
Associates pledged to collectively close their shops as soon as workers seized any single bakery. 44 This did not keep owners from threatening workers with obsolescence. "Almost all bakeries," argued owners, were ordering machinery from the United States. "Bakeries will only need three workers at most, instead of twenty or thirty." The massive firings were to begin in a month. Arrache and Córdoba claimed they had imported American machines precisely in order to "avoid the recent difficulties created by the demands of some amasijo workers." They announced the imminent dismissal of eighteen bakers. This threat, however, was a bluff: Six years later, Arrache and Córdoba's Recabado Street bakery employed at least thirty-five workers, far more than most. "Sólo tres obreros emplearán los panaderos," El Pueblo 4/1/1919. "Dificultades entre propietarios y trabajadores de amasijos," El Pueblo 4/28/1919. "Fábricas de pan y bizcochos." negotiated individually with the union forfeited his access to the fund. 45 This solidarity extended beyond business, into banquets and charity events at the Centro Vasco and the Casino Español, where the bakery owners figured prominently. 46 In addition to this internal unity, owners enjoyed high political connections that sprang from their control over the subsistence of the city and their role as middlemen. In this sense, the message of Union of Bakery Proprietors was as much an admonition to associates as it was for local authorities. Attacks on owners' property and authority would jeopardize the bread supply for the entire city, which could then had disastrous consequences for the government. Whether effected by workers or owners, the closure of bakeries disrupted the food supply beyond bakeries. During strikes consumers compensated for the lack of bread with more tortillas, which invariably led maize merchants and tortilla sellers to raise prices. 47 As a result, the poorest families who ate the least bread suffered the most. "If there is no bread," asked a commentator, "what did the revolution achieve?" The political elite was keenly aware of the importance of ensuring the supply of bread and forged close relations with the owners and grain traders. Alvaro
Obregón, for instance, exchanged chummy letters with Pedro Albaitero's nephew Pedro Irigoyen over wheat imports and barbecues on his ranch; later Obregón gave Irigoyen an important post in the Secretary of Agriculture. 48 As much as the politics of bakery labor derived from the place of bakeries in the city, the government's resolve to break the strikes also responded to its relationship with organized labor in general. In 1921, the bakers co-founded the anarcho-syndicalist Confederación General de Trabajadores (CGT), which formed in opposition to the reformist quasi-official Confederación Regional de Obreros de México (CROM). 49 As ties between the CROM and the regime increased, so did the repression against the CGT unions. 50 That the strikers jeopardized the food supply and opposed the CROM gave the government little inclination to support them. The most expedient way to deal with the "bread question" and, at the same time, with dissident labor organizations, then, was by putting down the strikes.
Nonetheless, this strategy had weaknesses that eventually led officials to pressure owners to negotiate. The regime had little interest in furthering the cause of independent anarchosyndicalism, but it based its legitimacy, rhetorically at least, on the vindication of the lower classes. The spectacle of protecting owners-Spaniards no less-from workers who demanded their constitutional rights threatened to undermine this legitimacy. The bakers' union seized upon this weakness to put into doubt the revolutionary character of the government's actions. The "bread industry is in the hands of a foreign monopoly that exploits the sons of Mexico." 51 Furthermore, the May 1928 strike showed bakers' ability to paralyze the bread supply.
By the late 1920s, there more than two hundred bakeries in Mexico City; almost of their workers belonged to the CGT. During the four days of the strike, bread was so precious that the presence of it was a sign of treachery. Four striking bakers were at a downtown cantina when they saw a man walk by with a "sack of bread." When they tried to take it, the man stabbed one of the bakers, killing him, and ran off with the bread. 52 The government had to mobilize considerable resources and energy to defend bakeries. The political costs of this rose in tandem with bakers' ability to paralyze bread production.
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The government's strategy of strike-breaking also weakened together with the waning influence of the CROM. Extravagant and corrupt, CROMista leadership became a political liability. 
From Class Struggle to Partnership
After government officials and employers shifted from strike breaking to negotiations, their challenge was how to improve working conditions for bakers, and thus prevent strikes from disrupting the supply of bread, without causing a rise in the price of bread that would erode the spending power of other workers. Put another way, the bind officials found themselves in as "arbiters" of class equilibrium was to convince owners to pay workers more and prevent them 55 Medin, El minimato presidencial: historia política del maximato (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) from raising prices, without driving them out of business or pushing them into political opposition. The middlemen role of the Spanish bakery owners continued to be the provisioning of bread; now they were also intermediaries between the state and workers.
In January 1929, six months after the union and owners signed the contract, the federal government promulgated a series of bakery regulations contained in a reglamento. The reglamento and the contract were separate and distinct documents. While the contract defined the wages, workday, benefits, hiring policies, and other accords that pertained to unionized bakeries, the reglamento governed all bakeries in the capital, regardless of unionization. Indeed, nothing in the reglamento explicitly linked it to unionization or the working conditions defined in the labor contract. Its ostensive objectives were to ensure hygienic, inexpensive bread and, ironically, to prevent the formation of monopolies. Nonetheless, the practical function of the reglamento was to create conditions that would allow the owners and union workers to comply with the contract.
To accomplish this, the reglamento sought to eliminate non-union bakeries' access to the market.
Since the vast majority of the unionized shops belonged to Spaniards, this was tantamount to formalizing the ethnic monopoly.
The reglamento mandated that bakeries fulfill several new requirements in order to obtain a license. Bakeries had to meet the health code and be easily visible to inspectors. Their production areas (fábricas) had to open directly onto the street and display a sign on the outside, no smaller than a square meter. In order to professionalize bread production and ensure hygienic conditions, the new laws ordered that fábricas could not be located "within tenements or apartments, but only in buildings that are not directly connected with residences." Retail outlets (expendios) could only sell bread from licensed fábricas; the same applied to street vendors and small neighborhood grocery stores.
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Two other provisions placed more explicit restrictions on the market and generated the greatest controversies. The first limited the spatial distribution of bakeries by imposing a minimum of five hundred meters between fábricas and three hundred meters between expendios.
The second introduced price fixing, which had not been applied to bakeries since independence. 59 The price was set at five cents for two pieces of bread with a total weight of 160 grams. Finally, the reglamento established a comisión mixta, a task force that included owners, unionists, and government officials who were to advise the city government on "prices, weight, quality, and other circumstances pertaining to bread." The reglamento did not confer the commission any enforcement authority; however, the members delegated inspectors-unionist bakers-to collaborate with police and health inspectors in the persecution of violators.
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Although the reglamento focused on hygiene, infrastructure, and licensing, it was aimed specifically at the non-unionized small bakeries. Some of their operators were long-time residents who had established modest workshops before the 1920s; others were village bakers who had recently arrived along with the waves of rural migrants uprooted by the revolution.
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Some had worked as scabs during the strikes. Displaced by the union contracts, these selfdescribed "simple workers emancipated from the tyranny of foreign capitalists" set up their own bakeries. 62 The violent encounters with strikers in previous years likely made them adverse to unions, and the constitution established their right to not unionize. Another letter to President Abelardo Rodríguez alleged that, "The totality of market retailers get bread at night and take it to their homes, which, on account of their economic conditions, are not hygienic. They sleep with the baskets of breads among the bad air, the lice and an infinity of parasites that later go onto the consuming public that, because of their limited resources, goes to the markets to buy supposedly cheaper bread." Many vendors had "syphilis, tuberculosis, and leprosy" and "never wash their hands, etc. legal. Inspection reports show that few of the major bakeries met the health code. 67 Records of municipal fines show that owners of licensed bakeries also ran clandestine ones; fines from these transgressions were another business expense. 68 The defining characteristic of the small producers, besides their size and their nationality, was the fact that they did not employ union labor and therefore did not have to comply with the obligations of the labor contract.
Ironically, the reglamento protected the dominant, unionized bakeries tacitly, through language that appeared to defend the small producers. Authorities claimed that the distance requirements and the minimum prices kept predatory competitors from establishing shops next door to small bakeries and driving them out of business by dumping cheap bread. In practice, however, the distance requirements guaranteed-indeed, codified-the dominance of the bakeries already located in the central neighborhoods. Similarly, the reglamento's prohibition of "persons or associations that effectuate any combination that could constitute improper competition" did not refer to the simultaneous ownership of wheat fields, mills, yeast factories, "It is inexplicable that small bakers are imprisoned and mistreated when they sell inexpensive bread in order to alleviate the hunger of the people." 92 The comisión mixta confiscated so much bread from the small bakeries and market stalls that the small producers said they were "being destroyed." 93 Another complained that, "The legal office of the city government harasses us with excessive fines because it is in connivance with the monopolists."
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Although it was exceedingly clear that the comisión mixta was pursuing small producers and petty retailers in favor of the dominant bakeries, the government continued to insist that the reglamento served the general public's wellbeing. The city governor declared that, "Although it is true that consumers, particularly in the poor neighborhoods, are accustomed to buying three pieces of bread for five cents, it is in the false belief that they are receiving greater quantity for the same price. In reality, they acquire the same or less total weight of bread that is undoubtedly of inferior quality. They must realize that it is more advantageous to buy higher quality and weightier bread than a larger number of pieces." 95 Furthermore, "prohibiting the sale of such bread is imminently revolutionary" since lighter pieces of bread meant less drudgery for bakers.
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That is, consumers, "especially in poor neighborhoods," so easily duped by simple prestidigitation, could feel satisfied knowing that their ever-smaller bolillos were emblems of revolutionary justice. The city government declared that it would not issue any new licenses to retail outlets that were not part of established bakeries, regardless of their location. In theory, peddlers and tendajón owners who had already received licenses could continue. 97 However, many complained that city officials refused to renew their permits. 98 A widow who ran a tendejón in Plaza Garibaldi wrote the city government to ask, "Is it possible that such a decision has been made, which will damage us poor people who lack fábricas and only subsist thanks to our bread sales?" 99 When the small producers wrote to the government requesting that the minimum prices be canceled, authorities responded that their request was impossible "because the objective of the restrictions on the free sale of bread is to prevent illicit competition and the formation of monopolies." 100 Authorities continued to justify their defense of the Spanish monopoly by insisting that they were actually fighting monopolies.
Another strike erupted in January 1938 when owners refused the union's demand for higher wages. The usual violence against non-union bakeries ensued, with strikers breaking the counters, throwing dough onto the floor, damaging machines, and beating the workers inside. At one bakery, they drenched the owner in cold water; at another, they scattered the long line of customers. The police arrived at another bakery, not to protect the workers inside, but rather to convince them to stop working. 101 Strikers closed the highways that entered the city in order to keep out bread from outlying towns. When they found a man walking down the street with a including the "so-called small producers who have adopted a posture of open rebellion."
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Whereas authorities previously had denied the actual effects and purpose of the reglamento, they now emphasized the alliance of the state, the union, and owners against the threat that the small producers represented toward the achievements of the revolution. In January 1939, after another day of conflicts between small producers and the comisión mixta, announcers on the weekly government radio broadcast, "La Hora Nacional," denounced the "illegal competition" and the "reactionary agitation" of the small bakery owners. Advisors to President Lázaro Cárdenas warned that the bakery struggle made the government vulnerable to criticism from the right. "The Reaction," a report noted, "takes any disruption caused by the revolutionary efforts and uses it against the government." The bread conflicts were especially damaging because a large number of people of limited economic possibilities, petty retailers (canasteros) and small producers, have had to be eliminated." This was particularly embarrassing since the "large producers" whom the reglamento protected made bread whose "weight and quality have diminished in an alarming fashion […] for the simple reason that they are not willing to lower their profits, accustomed as they are to an anachronistic system that has yielded them enormous riches." The report urged the president to find employment for the small producers in state-sponsored cooperatives, where they would "make countries, it is among such groups of small producers that Fascism has recruited its infantry."
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This political pressure, added to the street violence against small producers and the growing discontent among consumers, help explain a sharp change in the government's rhetoric. In April 1939, on the heels of another wave of violence against small producers, the city governor cancelled the comisión mixta, arguing that "it has damaged the collective interest and strengthened, through new forms, the old monopolistic tendency." In his declaration, he expressed what had been obvious for the last ten years:
The strongest industrialists declared they would accept the benefits the union demands, but only as long as the district government dictates a reglamento that would allow the comisión mixta to retain absolute powers over everything that pertains to the production and sale of bread. In other words, the large bread producers are willing to improve the conditions of their workers if, in exchange, the government gives a legal form to their monopoly and, furthermore, delegates to them sufficient authority to persecute and exterminate their competitors.
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Owners expressed their indignation in an open letter to Cárdenas. "Our blood has been offered in futile defense; it is unjust that now we are made to appear like exploiters of a people we respect and love." 120 They need not have been quite so concerned, for the distance requirements and price fixing remained. These regulations continued to bolster their monopoly that now further enjoyed the protection by the state and unionized workers.
Conclusion
The Spanish bakery owners who became deeply entrenched in the everyday subsistence 
